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Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An




Of the three elements necessary to prove copyright infringe-
ment-copyright ownership, access, and substantial similar-
ityl-the last is not only the most important component, but also
the most difficult to define and apply. Copyright ownership is a
statutory formality easily satisfied prior to the institution of litiga-
tion.2 Access is a straightforward proof question that can be dis-
posed of by a showing of striking similarity.' However, no copy-
right action can succeed without a showing of substantial
similarity, making the concept the theoretical and practical corner-
stone of copyright litigation. Unfortunately, substantial similarity
is impossible to define, and nearly as onerous to apply.
The substantial similarity standard is particularly difficult to de-
fine and implement in the litigation of music copyright actions.
Despite numerous attempts, the federal courts have failed to for-
mulate a fully utilitarian framework for determining musical sub-
stantial similarity.
The most realistic method adopted to date is that currently em-
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1. Melville B. Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright, §§ 13.01 - 13.03 (Matthew Bender
& Co., 1990)("Nimmer, Copyright").
2. Registration of the copyright is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a federal copy-
right infringement claim. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 USC § 411 (1992). However, the require-
ments for copyright registration are minimal. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v McDonald's
Corporation, 562 F2d 1157, 1163 n 5 (9th Cir 1977). The registered work need not be new,
but simply an original creation of the copyright owner. See Copyright Act, 17 USC at § 201,
§ 411, § 501(b); Krofft, 562 F2d at 1163 n 5, citing Donald v Uarco Business Forms, 478 F2d
764, 765-66 (8th Cir 1973); Roth Greeting Cards v United Card Co., 429 F2d 1106, 1109 (9th
Cir 1979); Alfred Bell & Co. v Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir 1951).
3. See, for example Arnstein v Porter, 154 F2d 464, 468 (2d Cir 1946)..
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ployed in the Ninth Circuit. Commonly called "the Krofft test,"
this process consists of a two-part examination designed to deter-
mine substantial similarity between all types of creative works.'
The fact finder must determine whether both the ideas and expres-
sion of ideas embodied in the allegedly infringing creative work are
substantially similar to those in the plaintiff's version.' The deter-
mination of similarity of ideas depends upon extrinsic, objective
factors. The resolution of whether the expression of the ideas is
similar is determined using the sensibilities of a reasonable
layperson.'
In theory, the Krofft test appears to be a sound method for de-
termining substantial similarity in all types of creative works, in-
cluding music. This test is fundamentally and operationally flawed
in two ways. First, the Krofft test for similarity of ideas, as drafted,
applies to all forms of expression, yet ignores the unique aspects of
certain types of expression. Music is particularly ill-suited to the
analysis designed by Krofft; due to music's inherently distinctive
features which dictate a different inquiry to determine substantial
similarity. Second, the dual Krofft test is founded upon a misappli-
cation of previous copyright cases and, as currently applied in the
Ninth Circuit, is not only confusing to the fact finder but can im-
properly influence and actually skew the outcome of music copy-
right actions.
Part I of this Article 'traces the evolution and fine-tuning of the
Krofft substantial similarity test. Part II exposes the inherent diffi-
culties in the Ninth Circuit's traditional, yet overbroad application
of the Krofft test by examining the complications it caused in a
recent music copyright case, Thompson v Richie.
7
4. This test was first articulated in Krofft, 562 F2d at 1164 (cited in Note 2).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. In 1985 Lionel Richie was sued for copyright infringement by Gene Thompson in
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Thompson v Richie, No. CV 85-
1583 (CD Cal filed March 7, 1985)("Richie I"). Also named as defendants were Richie's
record producer James Anthony Carmichael, his publishing company Brockman Music, and
his record company, Motown Record Corporation. Prior to trial, the District Court granted
summary judgment on behalf of the defendants. Id (June 20, 1986) (order granting summary
judgment).
The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Thompson v Richie, 820
F2d 408 (filed July 18, 1986)("Richie H"); in 1987, the appellate court reversed and re-
manded to the trial court. Richie H, 820 F2d at 408 (June 11, 1987)(order reversing grant of
summary judgment). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Richie v. Thompson, 484
US 1026 (1988).
After remand to the trial court, Tracy Singleton joined Thompson in a new suit against
Richie, alleging that Richie's song "Sela" was an infringement of their composition "You
278 Vol. 31:277
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Part III recommends that the Ninth Circuit revise its substantial
similarity test in two ways. First, the court should adopt a precise
definition of a musical idea, making uniform the application of the
substantial similarity test in all music copyright actions. Second,
the Ninth Circuit courts must change the order in which the par-
ties present their evidence to eliminate the confusion faced by fact
finders and appellate courts and increase the reliability of the ver-
dicts in these cases. In following these suggestions, the courts will
not only simplify the litigation process in the Ninth Circuit, they
will also increase the integrity and reduce inequity in the litigation
of music copyright actions.
A. Development of the Substantial Similarity Test
1. Early U.S. Copyright Laws and the Concept of "Copying"
Although the first recorded copyright case was decided in the
year 567,8 the concept of copyright was first recognized in the
United States in 1783 when the Colonial Congress passed a resolu-
tion recommending that states provide copyright protection to au-
thors or publishers of new books.9 Both Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts passed copyright laws that year, and by 1786, each of the
states (except Delaware) had enacted copyright laws.1" The follow-
ing year, the Colonial Congress granted to Congress the power to
and Me." Thompson v Richie, No. CV 88-1126 (filed March 1, 1988). This action was con-
solidated with the remanded case No. CV 85-1583, and the case proceeded to trial. (Case
No. CV 85-1583; CV 88-1126 consolidated April 20, 1988) ("Richie III"). In May, 1991, trial
commenced in Richie III, however the trial court ordered a mistrial. Richie III (May 8,
1991)(order declaring mistrial). The case finally went to trial on October 22, 1991 and ended
with a verdict for defendants on November 12, 1991.Los Angeles Times, B2 (November 13,
1991). Defendants appealed the verdict, but dismissed their appeal on May 18, 1992. Los
Angeles Times at B2. (Appellant's motion to voluntarily dismiss appeal).
(Most of the information relating to the Richie case was garnered from the author's per-
sonal observance of the trial, review of the court orders and docket, and interviews with
Lionel Richie, his attorney and experts, and plaintiffs' attorney and expert. Notes are on file
with the Duquesne Law Review).
8. William L. Prosser, American "Popular" Music and the Copyright Law, Third
Copyright Law Symposium 165 (1940)("Prosser, Copyright"). St. Coluniba copied a psalm
book possessed by his teacher, Finnian, and the decision of King Dermott in the Halls of
Tara reclaimed the copy. Prosser, Copyright at 169 (citing Bowker, Copyright - Its History
and its Law; How the Public Gets its New Music, an ASCAP pamphlet, 1933, page 9). This
case was chronicled by Adamnon in the year 617 and cited by Montalembert in "The
Monks of the West." Prosser, Copyright at 168-69.
9. Prosser, Copyright at 175 (citing 18 CJS Copyright and Literary Property § 163
(1939)).
10. Prosser, Copyright at 175.
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grant copyrights to "Authors and Inventors.""
On May 31, 1790, Congress passed the first federal copyright act
"for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of
maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such
copies."' 2 The 1790 Act provided that anyone who "shall print, re-
print, publish, or import, or cause to be printed, reprinted, pub-
lished, or imported . . . without the consent of the author or pro-
prietor thereof" shall forfeit all copies of such infringing material
and/or pay a fine.1 3 In 1856, the Act was expanded to include pro-
tection of dramatic works, 4 and musical compositions and artwork
were included in 1870.'6
In 1891, the Copyright Act was revised to, inter alia, prohibit
persons from ". . . engrav[ing], etch[ing], work[ing] copy[ing],
print[ing], publish[ing] dramatiz[ing], translat[ing], or import[ing],
either in whole or in part . . . " the work of others.16 While the Act
still made no mention of substantial similarity, it recognized that
something less than complete reproduction could still constitute il-
legal copying. Congress did not, however, say what quantity of sim-
ilarity was necessary to demonstrate copying. In addition, Congress
unfortunately never improved upon this fleeting focus on
similarity.
When Congress enacted the United States Copyright Act of
1909,17 it again failed to mention the concept of substantiality. It
merely prohibited the "copying" of another's creative expression."8
11. US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
12. Act of May 31, 1790, Chap XV, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
13. Id at § 2.
14. Act of August 18, 1856, Chap 169, 11 Stat 138 (1856).
15. Act of July 8, 1870, Chap 230, 16 Stat 198 (1870).
16. Act of March 3, 1891, Chap 565, § 4965, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).
17. 1909 Copyright Act,. 17 USC § 4, 5 (1909). The 1909 Act covered only published
works; unpublished works remained protectable only under state common laws. Among the
many other revisions (most of which became effective in 1978), the 1976 Act protected both
published and unpublished works. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 USC § 102 et seq (1992). See, for
example Emerson v Davies, 8 F Cases 615 (D Mass 1845); Drury v Ewing, 7 F Cases 1113 (D
Ohio 1862); Gray v Russell, 10 F Cases 1035 (D Mass 1839) Clayton v Stone, 5 F Cases 999
(SD NY 1829).
18. The term "copying" is shorthand for the infringement of any one of the copyright
holder's so-called "bundle of rights," namely, the rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, pub-
licly perform, and publicly display one's creative work. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 USC § 106
(1992); see, for example Stewart v Abend, 495 US 207, 220; Overman v Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 659 F2d 963, 966 (9th Cir 1981).
Prior to the enactment of the 1909 Act, various courts used the concept of copying in
copyright infringement actions. See Emerson v Davies, 8 F Cases at 615 (cited in note 17).
For an in-depth discussion of copyright pre-1909 see Amy B. Cohen; Masking Copyright
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 UC Davis L Rev 719
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Thus, the problem continued. Congress did make clear that the
Copyright Law afforded protection only to the expression of ideas,
not ideas themselves.19 For example, Rodin's "The Thinker" is an
expression of the idea of sober contemplation. Anyone can com-
pose a song, write a book, draw a sketch or even cast a sculpture
expressing this idea without necessarily infringing Rodin's rights in
his work. Rodin's sculpture, however, (i.e., his expression of the
idea of contemplation) cannot be copied.
This balancing of permission to use ideas with a prohibition
against borrowingan expression of ideas is appropriate since copy-
right law has sought throughout its history to promote and protect
"the progress of science and useful arts."20 In fact, prohibiting the
liberal borrowing of ideas would stifle the free flow of ideas neces-
sary to facilitate true creativity. As noted copyright commentator
Melville Nimmer wrote:
[T]he idea-expression line represents an acceptable definitional balance as
between copyright and free speech interests. In some degree it encroaches
upon freedom of speech in that it abridges the right to reproduce the "ex-
pression" of others, but this is justified by the greater public good in the
copyright encouragement of creative works. In some degree it encroaches
upon the author's right to control his works in that it renders his "ideas"
per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the greater public need for free
access to ideas as part of the democratic dialogue.2 1
Unfortunately, the'Copyright law does not make clear the extent
to which one must replicate Rodin's sculpture or aiy other work in
order to venture from the safe harbor of ideas into the stormy seas
of unlawful infringement.
Congress failed to improve this framework when it overhauled
the Copyright Law in 1976. In fact, the 1976 Act, like its predeces-
sor, is strangely silent as to substantial similarity, although by
1976, the federal courts had already developed a significant reli-
ance upon the doctrine. 22 The 1976 Act's legislative history does,
however, indicate that Congress intended to prohibit copying an-
other's expression "in whole or in any substantial part, and by
(1987)("Cohen, Masking").
19. 1909 Copyright Act, 17 USC § 4,5 (g,h)(1909). The 1976 Act also contains this
delineation. 17 USC § 102(b)(1976).
20. Becker v Loew's, Inc., 133 F2d 889, 891 (7th Cir 1943).
21. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L Rev 1180, 1192-93 (1970)(cited in Krofft, 562 F2d at
1170 (cited in note 2)).
22. See note 62 and accompanying text.
1993
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duplicating it exactly or by imitation or simulation."23 Implicit in
this prohibition is the suggestion that mere copying is not enough
to constitute infringement; the alleged infringer must have copied
the work exactly or by imitation or simulation. Arguably, an exact
or imitative duplication is synonymous with substantial similarity;
however, Congress offered no real guidance on the issue. This
quagmire has been left for the courts to resolve.
2. Development of the Substantial Similarity Test in the
Federal Courts
a. Nineteenth Century Cases
During the mid-1800s, the federal courts first attempted to de-
fine "copying," and, toward this end, introduced an early version of
the substantial similarity test. In Emerson v Davies,24 the federal
circuit court sitting in Massachusetts held that copying was shown
by: 1) proof that defendant had actually seen plaintiff's material
and 2) demonstration that "the resemblances in those parts and
pages are so close, so full, so uniform and striking, as fairly to lead
to the conclusion that the one is a substantial copy of the other, or
mainly borrowed from it. In short, that there is a substantial iden-
tity between them. 
'
25
In 1868, in Daly v Palmer,6 the federal circuit court sitting in
New York announced the "audience test," when it stated that the
standard for determining illicit copying was whether the works in
question are:
[1] recognized by the spectator; [2] through any of senses to which the rep-
resentation is addressed [3] as conveying substantially the same impres-
sions to, and exciting the same emotions in the mind in the same sequence
and order.2
7
This test represented the court's attempt to apply to copyright ac-
tions the "reasonable person" doctrine found in other areas of the
law.28
Although the audience test was modified significantly in later
years, as a result of Daly it has become an essential component in
23. HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 61 (1976); S Rep No 94-473, 94th Cong,
1st Sess 58 (1975)(emphasis added).
24. 8 F Cases 615 (D Mass 1845).
25. Emerson, 8 F Cases at 622 (emphasis added).
26. 6 F Cases 1132 (SD NY 1868).
27. Daly, 6 F Cases at 1138.
28. Nimmer, Copyright, Section 13.03[EI[2] at 62.6 (cited in note 1).
Vol. 31:277
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the determination of substantial similarity. Other circuit courts
followed suit and by the end of the nineteenth century, it was gen-
erally accepted throughout the circuits that illegal copying was
proven by a showing of defendant's access to plaintiff's material,
and that a reasonable observer would find the material to have
substantial identity or similarity. 9
Even as they almost unanimously adopted a substantial similar-
ity test to ascertain illegal copying, however, the federal courts did
not define "substantial" nor did they explain the point at which
mere similarity is sufficient to demonstrate misappropriation. The
Congress did not fill the gap. With each revision of the Copyright
Act, Congress remained strangely silent on the issue of substantial
similarity.
b. The Nichols Model
With no statutory guidance as to how to define "unlawful copy-
ing" or "substantial similarity," the federal courts adopted an "I
can't define it but I know it when I see it" approach following the
1909 Act. In Nichols v Universal Pictures Corporation,3" the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether
defendant infringed plaintiff's copyright when it produced a film
entitled "The Cohens and The Kellys," which plaintiff claimed was
taken from his play, "Abie's Irish Rose." Both plays employed a
"Romeo and Juliet" theme, involving a forbidden romance be-
tween an Irish character and Jewish character whose families are
in conflict. Writing for the court, Judge Learned Hand acknowl-
edged that copyright protection of a literary property is not lim-
ited to cases in which defendant exactly copied plaintiff's work and
recognized the need for a determination of "substantiality":
Then, the question is whether the part so taken is 'substantial,' and there-
fore not a 'fair use' of the copyrighted work; it is the same question as arises
in the case of any other copyrighted work. But when the plagiarist does not
take out a block in situ, but an abstract of the whole, decision is more
troublesome. 1
Judge Hand then admitted that a definition of substantiality was
elusive at best, and pronounced an "Abstractions Test" to deal
with the problem.
29. See, for example Greene v Bishop, 10 F Cases 1128 (D Mass 1858); Drury v Ew-
ing, 7 F Cases 1113 (SD Ohio 1862).
30. 45 F2d 119 (2d Cir 1930).
31. Nichols, 45 F2d at 121 (citations omitted).
1993
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Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since other-
wise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.32
Nichols thus represented the federal courts' first recognition of the
idea-expression dichotomy in copyright infringement actions.
Although Judge Hand admitted the law's inability to demarcate
between permissible copying and infringement (where the copying
of the idea ends and the copying of the expression begins), he did
draw a line in one sense: Nichols distinctly rejected the use of ex-
pert opinion and analytic dissection to resolve the issue. The plain-
tiff therein had presented to the court an intricate appraisal of the
two plays in question. The plaintiff's analysis pointed to a
"quadrangle" of the characters common to both plays, in which
each character was represented by the emotions - anger, love, anxi-
ety, despondency, hope, joy, disgust.
In spurning this analytic scrutiny, Judge Hand wrote:
This is not the proper approach to a solution; it must be more ingenuous,
more like that of a spectator, who would rely upon the Complex of his im-
pressions of each character. We cannot approve the length of the record,
which was due chiefly to the use of expert witnesses. Argument is argument
whether in the box or at the bar, and its proper place is the last. The testi-
mony of an expert on such issues, especially his cross-examination, greatly
extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better heard af-
ter the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed at all . . .We
hope that in this class of cases such evidence may in the future be entirely
excluded, and the case confined to the actual issues; that is ... whether the
defendant copied it, so far as the supposed infringement is identical.33
Initially, Nichols was not universally accepted; in fact, the Second
Circuit later criticized Judge Hand's abstractions test in Shipman
v RKO,3" saying that the term "abstractions" merely renames the
old method of comparing the "'similarity of sequences of incident'.
It is naturally difficult to compare literary works by using the ter-
minology of metaphysics, and the rule thus provided does not seem
to have been used since its suggestion." '35 Judge Hand shot back in
32. Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33. Id at 123 (emphasis added).
34. 100 F2d 533 (2d Cir 1938).
35. Shipman, 100 F2d at 537.
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his concurrence that, indeed, cases since Nichols had applied the
abstractions test 3 6 and had:
followed exactly the same doctrine that we are using now: it held that there
is a point where the similarities are so little concrete (are therefore so ab-
stract) that they become only 'theme', 'idea', or skeleton of the plot, and
that these are always in the public domain; no copyright can protect them.
The test is necessarily vague and nothing more definite can be said about
it. 3 7
Over the years, courts and commentators have come to appreciate
the wisdom and farsightedness of Hand's recognition of the differ-
ences between idea and expression, and that substantial similarity
is a troublesome, yet necessary, element of determining copyright
infringement. 8 Unfortunately, however, although later courts rec-
ognized the insight of the Abstractions Test, they failed to realize
that implicit in Judge Hand's Abstractions analysis is the reality
that similarity of expression does not always constitute copyright
infringement. It is possible that some similar expressions are part
of the public domain, and therefore, not protectible by copyright.
c. Arnstein v Porter
Eight years after Shipman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
attempting to incorporate Judge Hand's abstractions analysis, an-
nounced what has become one of the most quoted, yet misunder-
stood cases in copyright. In Arnstein v Porter,39 the court rejected
the litigious Ira B. Arnstein's ° claim that popular composer Cole
Porter's songs, "Begin the Beguine,". My Heart Belongs to Daddy,"
"I Love You," "Night and Day," I Love You Madly," "You'd Be So
Nice to Come Home To," and "Don't Fence Me In," plagiarized
36. For example Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 81 F2d 49 (2d Cir 1936).
37. Shipman, 100 F2d at 538.
38. See Krofft, 562 F2d at 1163 ("No court or commentator ... has been able to
improve upon Judge Learned Hand's famous 'abstractions test' "); Burroughs v Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F2d 610, 624 (2d Cir 1982).
39. 154 F2d 464 (2d Cir 1946).
40. Arnstein is notable as the last of eight unsuccessful copyright infringement ac-
tions brought in 12 years against various defendants by Arnstein, a perpetually disgruntled
songwriter who fervently believed his material had been stolen. See, for example Arnstein v
Shilkret, No. 8152 (SD NY 1933); Arnstein v.. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 11 F Supp
535 (SD NY 1935); Arnstein v American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 29
F Supp 388 (SD NY 1939); Arnstein v Broadcast Music, Inc., 46 F Supp 379 (SD NY 1942);
Arnstein v 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 52 F Supp 114 (SD NY 1943). For more on Ira
Arnstein, see Jeffrey A. Reed, "The Trials and Tribulations of Ira B. Arnstein," (unpub-




songs written by Arnstein.
The panel (which included Judge Hand) drafted an implied two-
part test-a test that owed at least a small part to Judge Hand's
abstractions test-for detecting copying. This test later became the
questionable blueprint for the Ninth Circuit's Krofft Test.
The court adopted what has been called the "Inverse Ratio
Rule," under which no amount of evidence of access can prove cop-
ying if the material in question is not similar. On the other hand,
the works which contain similarities that are so striking as to pre-
clude the possibility that the defendant could have created his
work independently of plaintiff's work justify an inference of copy-
ing, without more.41 Unfortunately, the Court failed to indicate at
which point on the continuum between dissimilar and strikingly
similar the concept of substantial similarity may fall.
The "Inverse Ratio Rule" effectively deals with the two extremes
in copyright actions, yet it does not address the more likely situa-
tions that fall in the middle ground. The court drafted a two-part
analysis to deal with such cases.
The first part of the test articulated by the Arnstein court ex-
amined access and similarity: a showing that the defendant had
access to plaintiff's work and that the two works contained similar-
ities could support an inference of copying. The court suggested
that the first prong of the test consists of analytic dissection, per-
haps through expert testimony:
As to. . . copying - the evidence may consist (a) of defendant's admission
that he copied or (b) of circumstantial evidence - usually evidence of access
- from which the trier of facts may reasonably infer copying . . . If there is
evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must
determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this
issue, analysis ("dissection") is relevant, and the testimony of experts may
be received to aid the trier of the facts.
4
1
If this dissection reveals the presence of. some structural similar-
ity, and plaintiff proves that defendant had access to his material,
copying is established. However, the court stated that mere copy-
ing is not enough, since there is such a thing as "permissible copy-
ing," in other words, copying that does not amount to copyright
infringement. 43 If copying is established, the fact finder must apply
the second portion of the test, namely, he must evaluate whether
41. Nimmer, Copyright at §§ 13.01-13.03(cited in note 1).
42. Arnstein, 154 F2d 468 (footnotes omitted).
43. Arnstein 154 F2d at 472.
Vol. 31:277
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the similarities are sufficient to lead an average layperson to be-
lieve that the defendant illicitly copied plaintiff's work:
On that issue . . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; accord-
ingly, on that issue, "dissection" and expert testimony are irrelevant . . .
Whether (if he copied) defendant unlawfully appropriated presents, too, an
issue of fact. The proper criterion on that issue is not an analytic or other
comparison of the respective . . . compositions . . . The plaintiff's legally
pro-tected interest is the potential financial return from his compositions
which derive from the lay public's approbation of his efforts. The question,
therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what
is pleasing to the [eyes and] ears of lay[persons], who comprise the audience
for whom such popular [works are] composed, that defendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."
Similarities sufficient to lead to the conclusion that they are not
mere coincidence are enough to support an inference of illicit copy-
ing. However, like its predecessors, the Arnstein court could not
and did not indicate any point at which similarities become sub-
stantial enough to justify such an inference. Although the court did
not specifically interpret "substantial similarity," it held that simi-
larities sufficient to lead a fact finder to conclude that the similari-
ties are not mere coincidence are sufficient to permit a finding of
illicit copying-copyright infringement.45
The court asserted that "analytic or other comparison" is not
the proper criterion for the layperson portion of the test, yet it is
appropriate for the parties to present expert testimony for the lim-
ited purpose of assisting the trier of fact
in determining the reactions of lay auditors [in the layperson portion of the
test]. The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their
views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff's or defendant's works are
utterly immaterial on the issue of misappropriation. 6
Obviously, under Arnstein, the use of expert testimony is not lim-
ited to the analytic portion of the test. Expert testimony may be
presented, when necessary, in the subjective part of the test.
It has been assumed that the Arnstein panel implied that courts
should apply the analytic portion of the test first, then move on to
the average layperson test. 7 If this is true, however, the court
failed to follow its own apparent suggestion, leaping over the ana-
lytic portion of the test directly to the audience test:
44. Id at 468, 472-73 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id at 469.
46. Id at 473.
47. See Krofft, 562 F2d at 1165.
1993 287
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We turn first to the issue of copying. After listening to the compositions as
played in the phonograph recordings submitted by defendant, we find simi-
larities; but we hold that unquestionably, standing alone, they do not com-
pel the conclusion, or permit the inference, that defendant copied. The sim-
ilarities, however, are sufficient so that, if there is enough evidence of access
to permit the case to go to the jury, the jury may properly infer that the
similarities did not result from coincidence. 8
The court did not apply the analytic dissection it had apparently
recommended; it merely found that the recordings sounded simi-
lar, and that the similarities could be considered substantial if the
plaintiff submitted strong evidence of access.49 The court did not
bifurcate the test or employ any analytic dissection:5
Moreover, contrary to subsequent interpretation, in formulating
this copying versus illicit copying test, the Arnstein court made no
mention of any dichotomy between the expression of an idea and
the idea itself; in fact, the court does not refer at all to either ideas
or expressions.51 It is possible that the test tacitly recognizes the
idea-expression dichotomy, since the existence of similarities in the
works could demonstrate duplication of the idea, while the sub-
stantiality of the similarities establishes the extent of copying of
the expression. When, however the court's glaring failure even to
refer to the idea-expression dichotomy is considered in light of its
seemingly inconsistent application of its copying versus illicit copy-
ing test, it becomes apparent that the Arnstein panel intended to
formulate a test far different than often assumed.
Under Arnstein, the appropriate consideration is whether an av-
erage layperson would recognize the disputed works as substan-
tially similar.2 If the fact finder concludes that the material is not
substantially similar under this test, copyright infringement has
not been proven.5
If, however, the material does appear to an average layperson to
be substantially similar, expert testimony would be appropriate to
assess whether the material that plaintiff claims is substantially
similar to defendant's is protectible (in other words, whether it is
truly expression, not merely an idea, or whether the expression is
48. Arnstein, 154 F2d at 469.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Raphael Metzger, Name That Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Mu-
sical Plagiarism, 5 Loy Ent LJ 61, 83 (19851.
52., Arnstein, 154 F2d at 469.
53. Id.
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not in the public domain).5 4
Later courts utterly disregarded the Arnstein court's evident in-
tentions, instead either lumping the two tests together completely,
or strictly bifurcating them so that experts play no part. in the
layperson analysis. 5
Until the mid 1970s, most courts took the former approach, vir-
tually abandoning the analytical dissection portion of the test, re-
lying instead upon the observations of a reasonable layperson. 56
For example, in Ideal Toy Corp. v Fab-Lu Ltd.,"7 the Second Cir-
cuit defined "substantial similarity" as sufficient similarity to
cause an average layperson to recognize the alleged copy as having
been appropriated from the copyrighted work.58 The Ideal Toy
court justified its truncation of the first part of the Arnstein sub-
stantial similarity test on the ground that Arnstein's tactic was
merely an alternative way of formulating the issue of substantial
similarity.59
Ironically, one notable exception to this pattern occurred in Sec-
ond Circuit when the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York relied heavily upon expert testimony and
analytical dissection to determine that George Harrison had unin-
tentionally plagiarized "He's So Fine" when he composed "My
Sweet Lord.""0 The court explained:
He's So Fine ... is a catchy-tune consisting essentially of four repetitions
of a very short basic musical phrase "sol-mi-re," (hereinafter motif A), al-
tered as necessary to fit the words, followed by four repetitions of another
short basic musical phrase, "sol-la-do-la-do," (hereinafter motif B). While
neither motif is novel, the four repetitions of A, followed by four repetitions
of B, is a highly unique pattern. In addition, in the second use of the motif
B series, there is a grace note inserted making the phrase go "sol-la-do-la-
re-do."
My Sweet Lord . . . also uses the same motif A (modified to suit the
words) four times, followed by motif B repeated three times, not four. In
place of He's So Fine' fourth repetition of motif B My Sweet Lord has a
transitional passage of musical attractiveness of the same approximate
length, with the identical grace note in the identical second repetition. The
54. Id at 473.
55. See notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
56. See Reyher v Children's Television Workshop, 533 F2d 87 (2d Cir 1976).
57. 360 F2d 1021 (2nd Cir 1966).
58. Ideal Toy Corp, 360 F2d at 1022.
59. Id at 1023.




harmonies of both songs are identical. 1
Bright Tunes notwithstanding, by the mid-1970s it was generally
accepted in many Circuits that copyright infringement was proven
by evidence that 1) the defendant had access to the plaintiff's
copyrighted work; and 2) a reasonable layperson would find de-
fendant's material to be substantially similar to plaintiff's work.2
Analytic dissection, with or without expert testimony, was not an
essential component.
B. The Krofft Test
With the increase of copyright infringement actions in its terri-
tory, the Ninth Circuit attempted to rekindle attention to the idea-
expression dichotomy. In Sid & Marty Krofft Productions v Mc-
Donald's Corporation, the Court developed a strict bifurcated
test expressly designed to embrace the idea-expression dichotomy.
While it represented a noble attempt to deal with this difficult
concept, however, Krofft may have caused more problems than it
solved.
In Krofit, McDonald's was accused of copying Sid & Marty
Krofft's H.R. PufnStuf television show in their McDonaldland ad-
vertising campaign. In finding that the defendant had infringed
the Kroffts' copyright, the court revived the Arnstein test, but ig-
nored the practical application. The Krofft court bemoaned the de-
mise of the idea-expression concept in copyright cases, noting that
it is a necessary component of copyright litigation.
It has often been said that in order to establish copyright infringement a
plaintiff must prove ownership of the copyright and "copying" by the de-
fendant. "Copying," in turn, is said to be shown by circumstantial evidence
of access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the
copyrighted work and defendant's work .... Under such statements, in-
fringement would be established upon proof of ownership, access, and sub-
stantial similarity. Application of this rule, however, would produce some
untenable results ... The test for infringement ... has been given a new
61. Bright Tunes, 420 F Supp at 178 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that
George Harrison's expert witnesses claimed the songs were not substantially similar since
they contained different words and number of syllables. The court rejected this argument on
the ground that song lyrics are completely unrelated to the essential musical kernel. Id at
178 n 6.
62. See, for example Reyher v Children's Television Workshop, 533 F2d at 90 (cited
in note 56); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v Salkeld, 511 F2d 904 (3d Cir 1975); Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v Newman Brothers, Inc., 373 F2d 905 (6th Cir 1967); Gray v. Eskimo Pie Cor-
poration, 244 F Supp 785 (D Delaware 1965).
63. 562 F2d 1157.
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dimension. There must be ownership of the copyright and access to the
copyrighted work. But there also must be substantial similarity not only of
the general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well. Thus two
steps in the analytic process are implied by the requirement of substantial
similarity. 4
The court held that the trier of fact must employ a two part
analysis to determine substantial similarity. The first half of the
test objectively considers similarity of ideas.
We shall call this the 'extrinsic test.' It is extrinsic because it depends not
on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be
listed and analyzed. Such criteria include the type of artwork involved, the
materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject. Since it
is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are
appropriate. 6
The court then instructed lower courts to next apply the "intrin-
sic test" to determine whether a reasonable layperson would find
the two works substantially similar.
The test to be applied in determining whether there is substantial similarity
in expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one - depending on the response
of the ordinary reasonable person. It is intrinsic because it does not depend
on the type of external criteria and analysis which marks the extrinsic test
• ..Because this is an intrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testi-
mony are not appropriate.6"
The court insisted that it was not making new law, but was
merely developing the theme that Arnstein had sounded thirty
years before.
We believe that the court in Arnstein was alluding to the idea-expression
dichotomy which we make explicit today. When the court in Arnstein re-
fers to "copying" which is not itself an infringement, it must be suggesting
copying merely of the work's idea, which is not protected by the copyright.
To constitute an infringement, the copying must reach the point of "unlaw-
ful appropriation" or the copying of the protected expression itself. We ana-
lyze this distinction in terms both of the elements involved idea and expres-
sion and of the tests to be used extrinsic and intrinsic in an effort to clarify
the issues involved.
6 7
This bold assumption of what the Arnstein court "must be sug-
gesting" has been roundly criticized.68 One critic even called Krofft
64. -Krofft, 562 F2d at 1162, 1164 (citations omitted).
65. Id at 1164.
66. Id (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
67. Id at 1165 (emphasis added).
68. See, for example Montgomery Frankel, "From Krofft to Shaw, and Beyond: The
Shifting Test for Copyright Infringement in the Ninth Circuit," (unpublished manuascript)
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"easily the most foolish of the Ninth Circuit's copyright
decisions. ' 9
The fundamental problem with the Krofft test is that it is rooted
in a misunderstanding of Arnstein. The Krofft court understanda-
bly wished to refine the test for substantial similarity. Instead of
making surgical adjustments in keeping with Arnstein, however,
the Kro ft court greatly distorted the intention of the Arnstein
panel, yet claimed that it was merely making explicit what the
Arnstein court alluded to. The fact that it was misconstruing the
Arnstein model was, however, of no concern to the Krofjt court.
We do not resurrect the Arnstein approach today. Rather we formulate an
extrinsic-intrinsic test for infringement based on the idea-expression dichot-
omy. We believe that the Arnstein court was doing nearly the same thing.
But the fact that it may not have been does not subtract from our
analysis.7'
When it insisted that the substantial similarity test be strictly bi-
furcated into an extrinsic/intrinsic (expert/layperson) analysis, the
Krofft court ignored the Arnstein language that recommended us-
ing expert testimony to illuminate the layperson assessment.
C. Post-Krofft
The effect of Krofft on copyright actions has been significant.
Prior to Krofft, the Ninth Circuit courts struggled with the concept
of substantial similarity. 1 After 1977, the courts treated the issue
as having been settled, applying the Krofft test with few questions
or changes. The few changes that were made were merely adjust-
ments and minor interpretations.
72
Beginning in 1981, a series of cases attempted to define an
"idea" for the purpose of applying the Krofft test.73 These cases
ASCAP Copyright Symposium 1991 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition ("Frankel,
Infringement").
69. Liebig, Copyright Inroads on the Public Domain in the Ninth Circuit, 9 Ent L
Rep No 7 (December, 1987)("Liebig, Inroads").
70. Krofft, 562 F2d at 1165-66 n 7.
71. See, for example International Luggage Registry v Avery Products Corporation,
541 F2d 830 (9th Cir 1976); Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd. v Kellogg Company, 513
F2d 913 (9th Cir 1975); Roth Greeting Cards v United Card Company, 429 F2d at 1106;
Schultz v Holmes, 264 F2d 942 (9th Cir 1959).
72. See notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
73. See, for example Shaw v Lindheim, 908 F2d 531 (9th Cir 1990); Litchfield v
Spielberg, 736 F2d 1352 (9th Cir 1984) cert denied 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Bekic v Crichton,
761 F2d 1289 (9th Cir 1985), cert denied 474 US 826 (1985); Jason v Fonda, 526 F Supp 774
(CD Cal 1981) aff'd and incorporated by reference, 698 F2d 966 (9th Cir 1982).
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defined idea as "plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, char-
acters, and sequence.
' 74
In addition, the court changed the designation of the extrinsic/
intrinsic test to an objective/subjective standard.7 Under the ob-
jective test, the court assesses similarity of ideas. Although the
court attempted to define ideas, this definition was limited to liter-
ature, i.e., theme, plot, setting, pace, characters, and dialogue.
7 6
Under the subjective test, one looks to the subjective response by
the trier of fact as to similarity between the total concept and feel
of the works.77
One district court applied the Krofft test in a manner more in
keeping with the original Arnstein analysis. In Overman v Univer-
sal City Studios,78 the United States District Court for the Central
District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Uni-
versal City Studios in a copyright action in which plaintiff claimed
that the studio and co-defendant Richard Pryor used elements of
his work in the film "Bustin' Loose." The court applied the Krofft
test in the order defined by Krofft-extrinsic analysis followed by
intrinsic impressions.79 After finding, however, that the films in
question were not similar in expression, the court revisited the ex-
trinsic test and found that it did not support a finding of substan-
tial similarity:
The analytical discussion offered by plaintiff does not persuade the Court
otherwise . . . [Pilaintiff enumerates 19 points of alleged similarity among
his underlying and derivative works and defendants' screenplay. Of these,
points A, B, G, H and M, relating to the basic story line and the general
development of the characters and their relationships, involve only unpro-
tectible abstract ideas, and not expression. Some of the other alleged simi-
larities, points D, I, J, and S, fall under the category of "scenes a faire,"
forms of expression which are either stock scenes or which flow necessarily
from the elements common to the two works. Still other claimed similari-
ties, points C3, C4, E, K, L, N and 0 simply do not exist. All of the scenes
or characters mentioned in these points are clearly distinct as among the
competing works either with respect to their expression or as to their func-
tion or role within the particular work. The remaining alleged similarities,
points C1, C2, F, P, Q and R, are somewhat similar but not so similar as to
support plaintiff's copying claim. The use by defendants of these few iso-
74. Shaw, 908 F2d at 537.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id at 535. The Shaw court recognized the "total concept and feel" standard, first
articulated in Roth Greeting Cards v United Card Co., 429 F2d at 1110.
78. Overman, 605 F Supp at 350.
79. Id at 353.
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lated similar character traits and scenes does not give rise to a copyright
infringement.80
Although the court made a cursory nod to the Ninth Circuit's re-
quirement that the extrinsic/objective portion be tried first, the
court actually reversed the order of the tests.
The Ninth Circuit courts have, for the most part, however, fol-
lowed the Krofft test as drafted."1 This has not only perpetuated
the attractive features of the Krofft test, it has deeply ingrained
into copyright procedure the serious flaws the Krofft court
engendered.
DEFICIENCIES OF THE KROFFT TEST
A. Failure to Define Musical Idea
The Ninth Circuit courts have barely acknowledged, much less
tried to assuage the two major flaws inherent in the Krofft test.
Until these problems are addressed and remedied, however, music
copyright litigation will remain unnecessarily cumbersome and
unreliable.
The first problem with the Krofft test is its failure to appreciate
the inherently distinctive features of music that make it difficult to
fit within the Krofft framework. In Krofft and its progeny, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined "idea"' as subject matter,
setting, materials used, theme, plot, sequence of events, mood, set-
ting, pace, character, and so forth. 2
How does this apply to music? Simply stated, it does not. The
materials, subject matter and setting of a song are usually the mu-
sical instruments used, lyrics, arrangements, and related material.
These elements are peripheral augmentations, however, not ele-
ments of the composition itself. Unlike a literary idea, which was
carefully defined in Shaw,8" a musical idea has not been directly
addressed by the federal courts.
It is commonly believed that a musical idea consists of more
than only melody, harmony and rhythm. It is widely believed that
many factors-some of which are completely unrelated to the stark
80. Id at 353-54.
81. Notably, no other jurisdiction has adopted the Krofft test; thus, the Ninth Circuit
stands alone in its approach to substantial similarity. Most circuits have adopted a version
of the Second Circuit's Arnstein analysis. See Frankel, Infringement (cited in note 68).
82. Shaw, 908 F2d at 537.
83. Id.
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composition itself-contribute to a musical idea.8 4 These factors
are deemed to include tone, pitch, tempo, spatial organization,
consonance, dissonance, phrasing, accents, note choice, combina-
tions, interplay of instruments, bass lines, and the like.8 5 One com-
mon misconception is that a song's lyrics represent the idea of the
composition; however, lyrics constitute ideas that are absolutely
distinct from the musical ideas.8 6 For example, the lyrics of Bruce
Springsteen song, "Born in the U.S.A." connote pride and patriot-
ism. When rapper Luther Campbell changed the title of the song
to "Banned in U.S.A." and replaced Springsteen's lyrics with senti-
ments highly critical of government censorship, an entirely differ-
ent idea was conveyed. 7 Notwithstanding the change in lyrical
idea, the music remained the same and the musical idea was not
altered.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit courts have not developed a
uniform standard for determining what factors should be consid-
ered in assessing a musical idea. In fact, the courts have offered no
sound guidelines for defining or interpreting musical ideas in copy-
right actions. This ambiguity creates significant difficulties in ap-
plying the objective/extrinsic test under Krofft, since no one is sure
what the standard is.
B. Confusion
The second problem with the Krofft test is rooted in its miscon-
struction of the Nichols and Arnstein analyses.8 8 Both cases imply
that in most copyright actions, the analysis should be progressive,
in other words, the fact finder first determines copying, and then
determines illicit copying: idea expression. 9 Both cases also
strongly implied, however, that the fact that the expression seems
substantially similar does not mean that illicit copying took place.
It is possible that the expression may seem similar to a reasonable
layperson, but there is another reason that copyright infringement
is not present.90
As a result, the test is confusing at best and at worst can distort
84. See, for example Debra Presti Brent, The Successful Musical Copyright In-
fringement Suit: The Impossible Dream, 7 U Miami Ent & Sports L Rev 229 (Spring 1990).
85. Id at 241.
86. Bright Tunes, 420 F Supp at 178. See note 61.
87. See The Washington Post Bl. (July 4, 1990).
88. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text.




and skew the outcome of music copyright actions. The principal
problem is the possibility of improper influence. For example, a
juror listening to an articulate, impressively credentialed expert of-
fer extended testimony about the intricacies of the songs' struc-
tural similarities (using, perhaps one of the variety of standards
used in these cases) could easily be convinced that the songs-sound
similar when he may not have reached such a conclusion had he
listened to the material prior to hearing the expert testimony.
Learned Hand recognized this potential in the Nichols case in
1930:
[The admission of expert testimony] cumbers the case and tends to confu-
sion, for the more the court is led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsman-
ship, the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of
its considered impressions upon its own perusal. 91
This danger of confusion is even more likely in copyright cases in-
volving music, an area of which the average layperson has little
understanding. Such confusion could lead to skewed verdicts and
defeat the purpose of the bifurcated test.
The test is crafted in a dual manner in order to rigidly protect
the idea-expression dichotomy. Nevertheless, in practice it is all
but impossible to prevent such permeation of the issues.
C. Thompson v Richie
The problems of the improper influence of expert testimony on
the jury's verdict was perfectly illustrated in a recent music copy-
right case involving pop singer-songwriter Lionel Richie. In
Thompson v Richie,92 two unknown songwriters accused Richie of
copying their material in his songs "Sela", "Stuck on You" and
"Deep River Woman."93 The litigation was unnecessarily pro-
tracted and complicated as a direct result of the deficiencies in the
Krofft test.
The lawsuit was filed in 1985 in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. 4 The following year, the Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment in Richie's favor, finding
that there was no substantial similarity of ideas and expression be-
91. Nichols, 45 F2d at 123 (cited in note 30).
92. See note 7 and accompanying text.
93. The plaintiffs also brought claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, which claims were dismissed by stipulation. Richie I (cited in. note 7).
94. Id.
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tween the plaintiff's and Richie's songs."'
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ideman applied the Krofft ex-
trinsic/intrinsic analysis." He first considered the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Robert Winter, who declared that
there were similarities in the melody, harmony and rhythm of the
material in question."7 After listening to recordings of the material,
however, Judge Ideman found that no reasonable person could find
any such similarities were substantial. 8 In addition, Judge Ideman
found the lawsuit to be "frivolous" and awarded Richie $34,000 in
attorney fees and court costs. 99
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in 1987, question-
ing the trial court's findings as to both ideas and expression. 10 The
court found that plaintiff's expert raised a question of fact on the
issue of similarity of ideas.10 Although the court did not attempt
expressly to define a musical idea, it held that the expert's claim
that nineteen of the twenty pitches in the opening phrases of the
songs, plus similarities in the harmony and tempo raised'a ques-
tion of fact.102
On the issue of similarity of expression, the appellate court held
that there was a also a question of fact that precluded summary
judgment.0 3 Although it found that "the two songs appear to have
little similarity," the court stated that "the ears of the court must
yield to the ears of jurors" since there is "no bright line . . . as to
what quantum of similarity is permitted before crossing into the
realm of substantial similarity.' 0 4 The court also reversed Judge
Ideman's award of fees and costs since, because the case was going
to trial, it could not be deemed frivolous."0 5
The case first went to trial in May of 1991. Pursuant to an ear-
lier trifucation order'06 , the parties were to try the intrinsic portion
of the test first, followed by the extrinsic test. The determination









104. Id. This finding is particularly troubling since, the Court appears to hold that
summary judgment in copyright actions is never appropriate.
105. Id.
106. Order of Trifurcation and Separate Trials (January 29, 1989), Richie III (cited in
note 7).
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of whether Richie had access to plaintiffs' material was to be ad-
dressed last. 11 7 Unfortunately, when the court attempted to apply
this order, the court agreed with plaintiffs' attorney that the in-
trinsic test subsumed the extrinsic test."0 ' Specifically, the court
maintained that, should the jury find the songs to be substantially
similar under the extrinsic test, such a finding would be deemed a
finding that the ideas expressed were similar, and thus, the extrin-
sic test would have been satisfied without any analytic dissection
or expert testimony.'0 9 Unable to resolve the confusion, the court
107. Id.
108. Transcript of Proceedings, May 11, 1991, pp 67, 69, 80.
109. The problems and confusion caused by the Krofft test is apparent in the colloquy
between District Court Judge Marianna Phaelzer and counsel:
THE COURT: All right. Now if you should get a finding of substantial similarity on
the intrinsic portion of this test you will then want to put on an expert, won't you?
MR. STEINHART: Well, I take the position that this phase is on the substantial
similarity of expression . . . Once that is proved, that subsumes substantial similarity
of idea because it is the substantial similarity of expression of the ideas. If the jury
finds there is substantial similarity of expression, ipso facto they have found there is
substantial similarity of the ideas being expressed, so there is no need for any further
trial on the issue of substantial similarity.
THE COURT: I would agree with you about that.
* MR. ISAACMAN: That is not the law in the Ninth Circuit, Your Honor. There is
both an extrinsic test and an intrinsic test.
THE COURT: I know that.
MR. ISAACMAN: From the extrinsic test there is an opportunity for us to present
evidence that these ideas are not similar, that we have an opportunity to present
evidence that the material is not protectible material, that it is public.
THE COURT: No, that is a different problem . . . [I]f they were to come in with a
decision that the intrinsic test had been satisfied on substantial similarity, they have
found, have they not, in effect those things on the extrinsic test.
MR. STEINHART: According to Krofft the extrinsic test is merely to determine sub-
stantial similarity of idea.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STEINHART: And the intrinsic test is merely to determine substantial similar-
ity of the expression of the idea. If a finder of fact finds there is substantial similarity
of expression of ideas in applying an intrinsic test how-it would be illogical. They
couldn't find that there was not substantial similarity of ideas.
THE COURT: That is my point. "
MR. ISAACMAN: Your Honor, I don't think that that is the law in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. I think we are entitled to present to a trier of fact this similarity in the ideas and
that they are entitled to return a finding that the ideas are not similar. Unless the
plaintiff satisfies both the intrinsic test and the extrinsic test then the plaintiff has
not carried his burden.
THE COURT: I know . . . [I]n the music area there has to be proof of substantial
similarity of ideas as well as substantial similarity of expression. I think it is worth-
while . . . I look at these issues in all these cases particularly with reference to the
motions that were made to trifurcate the case, and I was convinced at that point that
this is a good idea, that they would be able to tell you whether there was similarity of
expression or not, but we are now in a position having listened - only listened to the
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declared a mistrial.110
The case finally went to trial in late 1991 on all of the issues. 1 '
As a result, the jury heard witnesses testify about access, followed
by an expert witness, followed by another witness on access, and so
forth. 1 2 Throughout the proceedings, the plaintiff played the songs
for the jury. The result was a hodge-podge of separate issues.
Another vague aspect of the trial was the expert testimony. The
experts for each party used entirely different standards to deter-
mine whether there existed any substantial similarity of ideas.
Garnett Brown, plaintiffs' expert, claimed that the idea inherent in
both plaintiff's and defendant's songs was that the songs were
forms of popular music." ' According to Brown, a musical idea does
not exist until it is expressed in musical form."" However, once it
is expressed, it is no longer merely an idea-it has crossed into the
music where if they come back and find for you, I cannot imagine how an expert
could get on the stand and contradict their finding on that part of the case .. .I
would think that in coming to that decision they have decided the whole substantial
similarity issue.
MR. STEINHART: I agree that that is the case because they have decided substan-
tial similarity of expression which subsumes idea.
THE COURT: I don't think an expert is in order.
MR. ISAACMAN: On that limited question?
THE COURT: No. I don't think an expert is in order at all . . . What I am address-
ing is something that is totally discreet, and that is, could you now put an expert on
the stand to contradict. the fact that there was. substantial similarity, not talking
about whether it is in the public domain. I have never thought you could, and there-
fore, I am asking you.
MR. ISAACMAN: Well, the answer is that the Ninth Circuit has a two-part test.
THE COURT: I know. That is what created double hearings in several cases recently
to try to figure out how you apply this, and up until the point when Shaw was handed
down which is after the entry of the ruling, it was my opinion that if you tried that
issues that you just tried and they found for the plaintiff on that issue, and that is it,
ant that you can't put on an expert now to say, "It may sound the same to you but I
am an expert and I want you to consider this."
MR. ISAACMAN: That the ideas are different.
THE COURT: No. I don't think you can do that. . . in consideration of the way the
Circuit has been looking at these things I believe that you now can't - that once you
had tried the intrinsic test, you tried substantial similarity . . .You can't ask them to
come back with a decision that there is a substantial similarity in the expression of
ideas here, and we found that, and then go back and see if the ideas were similar. Am
I making myself clear? I think we have got - I think the Ninth Circuit has created a
problem for us on intrinsic and extrinsic test, so let's talk about the instructions.
Id at 65-74.
110. Richie III (cited in note 7).
111. Author's notes (cited in note 7).
112. Id.




On the other hand, D. Anthony Ricigliano, Richie's music ex-
pert, testified that a musical idea is a musical thought that implies
a self-contained entity.' Ricigliano examined the musical ideas in
the material and determined that Richie's musical ideas were ut-
terly distinct from the ideas contained in plaintiffs' music. 17
It is impossible to determine what effect this method of present-
ing evidence had upon the jury. After a few hours of deliberation,
the jury found that Richie had not heard the plaintiff's songs, and
thus could not have infringed their copyright. 18 The jury never
reached the issue of substantial similarity of expression or idea.'19
Had the jury been required to assess substantial similarity, how-
ever, it would have been difficult to prevent their considerations
from being tainted.
One serious problem in this case resulted from the partici-pants'
disparate views as to the nature of a musical idea. Throughout the
proceedings, musical idea was defined as 1) a musical thought im-
plying a self-contained entity (defendant's expert);120 2) a musical
genre (plaintiff's expert); 2' and 3) pitch, harmony, and tempo (the
Court of Appeals). 2 It is possible, moreover, that, had the plain-
tiffs' appeal of the jury verdict been perfected,'2 3 a different three-
judge panel on the Court of Appeals would have applied an en-
tirely different definition.
In addition, the order of the proceedings could have led to seri-
ous confusion. 24 Even if the court had structured the trial accord-
ing to the Krofft mandate, 25 problems for the jury could still have
existed. Certainly, a jury could not have avoided being influenced
by the considerable expert testimony that occupied several days of
the three-week trial. As the trial was conducted, however,. confu-
sion was virtually guaranteed. It would have been very difficult for
the jury to strictly bifurcate their impressions of the evidence of
115. Id.
116. Author's notes (cited in note 7); letter from D. Anthony Ricigliano to author
(February 3, 1992) (discussing musical ideas).
117. Id.
118. See 1992 BPI Entertainment News Wire, November 15, 1991.
119. Id.
120. See note 116 and accompanying text.
121. See notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
122. Richie II (cited in note 7).
123. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal. Richie III (cited in note 7).
124. See note 105-111 and accompanying text.
125. See notes 63-67 'and accompanying text.
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similarity of idea and expression after the issues were presented in
whatever order the plaintiff chose. In the Richie case, this lack of
bifurcation proved not to be a problem since the plaintiffs failed to
prove that Richie had heard their song; thus, it was legally impos-
sible for Richie to have infringed his copyright.
REVISIONS TO THE KROFFT TEST
The Krofft test is inherently, but not fatally flawed. Although
the problems are serious, the solution need not be draconian. It is
possible to significantly improve the test by making two
adjustments.
A. Definition of Musical Idea
The failure and/or inability of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to provide any clear guidance as to the definition of musical
idea has left the district courts to their own devices, thereby pro-
moting inconsistency in copyright litigation actions. It is therefore
necessary to formulate and apply a consistent definition of musical
idea. It is difficult for most persons not schooled in music to devise
an accurate definition of musical idea, since it requires an acute
insight into musical theory. Nevertheless, it is possible to develop a
workable test, even if it means stepping outside the legal commu-
nity to do so.
The most practical and comprehensive definition found is that
devised by D. Anthony Ricigliano, whose work in copyright litiga-
tion cases has enabled him to develop a clear understanding of the
necessary interrelation between music and legal theory in these
cases."6 According to Ricigliano, a musical idea is a musical
thought which implies a self-contained entity; however, it generally
represents only a portion or fragment of a musical work which usu-
ally contains multiple ideas."l 7 A musical idea may be: 1) a single
line of pitch or rhythm (melodic); 2) a vertical group of pitches
(harmonic or chordal); 3) a series of time values without pitch
(rhythmic); or 4) a combination of pitch, rhythm and chord(s).12 8
A musical idea may consist of a single note, rhythm or chord.129
126. Ricigliano, chairman of the Theory Department at the Manhattan School of Mu-
sic, has assisted plaintiffs and defendants, including Lionel Richie, Michael Jackson, Mick
Jagger and Julio Iglesias, in a number of music copyright actions. See Intersong-USA v
CBS, Inc, 757 F Supp 274 (SD NY 1991).





For example, the opening "idea" of the song "One" consists of a
single note, followed by rest.1 30
More often, however, a melodic or musical idea consists of two or
more notes (pitch and rhythm)."' Some examples of compositions
that contain such ideas are:
2-Note Musical Ideas: "Feelings" "People" "Sunny" "Lady"
3-Note Musical Ideas: "Yesterday"
4-Note Musical Ideas: "Sleepy Time Gal" "We Are the World"
10-Note Musical Ideas: "They All Laughed (At Christopher Columbus)'
32
The end of a musical idea is usually determined by either 1) imme-
diate repetition of the same or varied idea; 2) the appearance of a
longer note value and/or a rest; or 3) the start of another different
musical idea. 33 When a work is accompanied by lyrics, the lyrics
are often used to determine the length of the musical idea; how-
ever, the content or idea of the lyrics do not constitute the idea of
the song.1
3
Use of this definition of musical idea would assist immeasurably
the determination of substantial similarity of musical works. In the
Richie case, the appellate court, plaintiffs' expert, and defendants'
expert each had a different concept of what constituted a musical
idea.135 The case would certainly have been aided and shortened
had everyone involved at least had some common idea of what the
rules are. Instead, the parties were forced to incur substantial ex-
pense. and inconvenience in the protracted, five-year litigation.
36
While it may not encompass every possible situation, Ricig-
liano's definition recognizes the unique aspects of music that make
it completely different from all other forms of copyrightable ex-
pression. It addresses the structural and artistic features of music
while giving clear guidance to the fact finder as to what she is ana-
lyzing. Most importantly, it makes uniform the standard to be






135. See notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
136. Lionel Richie, like many other prominent composers and recording artists who
have successfully defended such lawsuits, maintains insurance coverage for copyright in-
fringement actions, however these actions can result in considerable costs for defendants in
the form of rising premiums, lost revenue and damage to reputations. "That's Entertain-
ment; Entertainment Industry Insurance Excess and Surplus Lines," 89-4 Best's Review 54,
(August 1988).
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right actions in the Ninth Circuit.
B. Reverse the Order of the Substantial Similarity Test
The second proposed solution to the difficulties found in Krofft
is for the Ninth Circuit to apply the test in a manner similar to
that used in the Overman case.1"7
The first prong of the test should be the reasonable layperson
test.138 The fact finder should listen to the songs in question with-
out having heard any potentially prejudicial expert testimony. If
the fact finder believes the material is not substantially similar, the
case ends.
If, on the other hand, the fact finder believes that the songs
sound substantially similar, there would be a rebuttable presump-
tion that the ideas and expressions in the material are substan-
tially similar. The case would then proceed to the second step: the
defendant could present evidence showing that the similarities de-
tected were similarities in idea, not expression, and/or that the
similarities in expressions were based upon material found in the
public domain and therefore, not copyrightable. 13
9
Had this test been applied in the Richie lawsuit, the case would
have proceeded as follows: immediately after being impaneled, the
jury would have listened to the songs in dispute. If they believed
that the songs did not sound substantially similar in overall con-
text and feel, the case would have ended with a verdict for Richie.
If, on the other hand, the jury believed the compositions sounded
substantially similar, there would have arisen a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the works were indeed substantially similar in ex-
pression and idea. At that point, Richie could have presented an
expert to explain the differences between ideas and expressions
within -the songs.
For example, plaintiffs contended that Richie's "Stuck on You"
contains a 17-note sequence that sounds, to an average layperson,
substantially similar to an 11-note sequence in their "Somebody's
Got to Love Her."' 40 According to Ricigliano, however, this similar-
ity constitutes a mere idea."" The concluding five notes that com-
plete the thought are considerably different in "Stuck on You"
137. Overman, 605 F Supp at 353.
138. See note 66 and accompanying text.
139. See notes 78-80 and 88-90 and accompanying text.




than the nine concluding notes in "Somebody's Got to Love Her."
Thus, these ideas are not substantially similar.142
Even if the jury believed this similarity in ideas to be sufficient
to constitute similarity of expression, however, the descending pro-
gression occurring in both compositions is a common sequence fre-
quently found in popular music. 1 43 As such, it is in the public do-
main and is not subject to copyright infringement.' 4"
Certainly, such expert testimony could be taken prior to listen-
ing to the songs; however, it 'would probably be necessary for the
jury to listen to the material in order to follow and understand the
expert testimony. Therefore, the fact finders' aural impressions of
the material would likely be affected by the expert's own impres-
sions of the material.'
45
If the jury first listens to the material without any outside influ-
ence, however, the decision it would render would be far more pris-
tine than if it considers the songs after hearing expert testimony. ' 6
It is less likely that the jury's determination that the material
sounds similar would influence their consideration of the objective
expert testimony than that the expert testimony would influence
the jury's aural impressions. '
The approach recommended by Ricigliano"I has been ques-
tioned on the ground that the intrinsic test questions whether the
expression of the idea is substantially similar and the extrinsic test
deals only with whether the ideas are similar."19 As set forth in
Nichols and Arnstein, however, this is not true in practice: it is
quite possible for the expressions to sound similar to an untrained
ear, even if there has been no infringement.' 50
Ricigliano's approach' would substantially remedy the confu-
sion found in these cases and would also considerably, shorten the
time spent in such cases. If plaintiff's case is strong, the jury would
have to employ both the extrinsic and intrinsic tests in order to
determine the existence of substantial similarity. However, if a
case is weak but strong enough to survive summary judgment, as
142. See note 91 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See note 90 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
149. Richie III, Transcript of Proceedings (cited in note 7)
150. See notes 30-54 and accompanying text.
151. See notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
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was plaintiff's claim in the Richie litigation, Ricigliano's method
would likely terminate the trial at a much earlier stage.
Moreover, Ricigliano's approach reduces the risk that the jury
will be improperly influenced by the expert testimony.152 The lay
listener test would be performed as it should be - the initial vis-
ceral reaction of the fact finder would be the gauge without influ-
ence from the expert testimony. If, without considering any ana-
lytic dissection of the material, the jury finds the material not to
be substantially similar, reliance on such a finding is in keeping
with the true purpose of copyright protection. If a layperson's ear
does not detect similarities between the works, the second com-
poser's work could not be deemed to interfere with the original au-
thor's financial or commercial return. 5 The courts must recognize
this reality and apply the test in a way that reflects the true nature
of copyright law.
Ricigliano's method advances the purpose of copyright.' 54 As
noted in Arnstein, the plaintiff's legally protected interest is the
potential benefit he gains from his compositions which derives
from the lay persons acceptance of his work.'55 Unless the defend-
ant's material sounds substantially similar to plaintiff's work, and
thus could interfere with plaintiff's potential benefit from exploita-
tion of his work, plaintiff has suffered no real harm. It follows that,
even if the similarities between the works are substantial enough
for defendant's material to interfere with plaintiff's public benefits,
unless the defendant has actually taken something of plaintiff's
that was entitled to protection (as opposed to the copying of mere
ideas or public domain material), plaintiff should not be permitted
to recover from defendant.
In addition, Ricigliano's method of determining copyright in-
fringement balances the competing interests of protecting the art-
ist while encouraging the free flow of ideas, and at the same time,
ensures that copyright decisions are more reliable and accurate.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing revisions to the Krofjt test are attractive and via-
ble for three reasons. First, they resolve a problem that has
plagued lawyers and courts since the announcement of the Krofit
152. See note 91 and accompanying text.
153. See notes 44 and 66 and accompanying text.
154. See note 12 and accompanying text.
155. Arnstein, 154 F2d at 468, 472-73 (footnotes omitted).
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two-part substantial similarity test.15 Second, the revisions accu-
rately reflect the true nature of copyright infringement actions and
take into account the unique aspects of music that make the cur-
rent test unworkable in music actions. 157 Finally, the revisions are
relatively minor and will not require a major overhaul of the now
well-settled Krofft test.1 58 The revisions merely represent a signifi-
cant fine-tuning that will make the test a truly functional and re-
sourceful method for determining substantial similarity in music
copyright actions.
156. For a discussion of Krofft, see notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
157. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
158. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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